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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty; Background and Current Developments
Summary
A concise
guide to uranium weapons, the science and their legal status.
A comprehensive
nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) is the oldest item on the nuclear arms
control agenda. Three treaties currently bar all but underground tests with a maximum
force equal to 150,000 tons of TNT. The Natural Resources Defense Council
states the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715,
the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. The last U.S. test was held in
1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan
announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the
CTBT. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006.
Since 1997, the
United States has held 23 "subcritical experiments" at the Nevada Test
Site, most recently on August 30, 2006, to study how plutonium behaves under
pressures generated by explosives. It asserts these experiments do not violate the
CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Russia has
reportedly held some since 1998, including several in 2000.
The U.N. General
Assembly adopted the CTBT in 1996. As of April 30, 2008, 178 states had
signed it; 144, including Russia, had ratified; and of the 44 that must ratify the
treaty for it to enter into force, 41 had signed and 35 had ratified. Five conferences
have been held to facilitate entry into force, most recently in 2007.
Most Recent
Developments
On March 3-5,
scientists from 30 nations met in Vienna, Austria, to launch an evaluation of
the CTBT detection system, with the results due to be presented in June 2009. On
February 25, 2008, the United States paid the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization Preparatory Commission $23.8 million, restoring its voting rights
in the commission. In January, Barbados, Colombia, and Malaysia ratified the
CTBT. On December 17, 2007, Representative Tauscher introduced H.Res. 882,
"[expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Senate should initiate
a bipartisan process to give its advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." On December 6, the conference report on H.R. 1585,
the FY2008 defense authorization bill, was ordered to be printed. The bill provided
for biennial reports on U.S. nuclear test readiness and dropped a provision in the
Senate bill expressing the sense of Congress that "the Senate should ratify"
the CTBT. On December 5, by a vote of 176 for, 1 against (United States), and 4
abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/62/59 stressing the
importance of achieving the earliest entry into force of the CTBT. On November
19, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Director of Central
Intelligence John Deutch suggested a five-year renewable CTBT in lieu of the current
treaty.1 On October 24, Senator Jon Kyi delivered a speech critical
of the CTBT and of
Section 3122 in H.R. 1585, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, expressing the sense of Congress that the Senate
should ratify’ the treaty. The
speech was accompanied by a letter to the same effect with 41 signatures. On September 17 and 18, the U.N. held the fifth
conference on facilitating the treaty's entry into force, with 106
nations participating.2
History
A ban on nuclear
testing is the oldest item on the arms control agenda. Efforts to curtail tests
have been made since the 1940s. In the 1950s, the United States and Soviet
Union conducted hundreds of hydrogen bomb tests. The radioactive fallout from these
tests spurred worldwide protest. These pressures, plus a desire to reduce
U.S.-Soviet confrontation after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, led to the
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere, in space, and under water. The Threshold Test Ban
Treaty, signed in 1974, banned underground nuclear weapons tests having an
explosive force of more than 150 kilotons,
the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT, 10 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,
signed in 1976, extended the 150-kiloton
limit to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. President Carter did not pursue ratification of these treaties,
preferring to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, or CTBT, a ban on all nuclear explosions. When agreement
seemed near, however, he pulled
back, bowing to arguments that continued testing was needed to maintain reliability of existing weapons, to
develop new weapons, and for other purposes.
President Reagan raised concerns about U.S. ability to monitor the two
unratified treaties and late in his term started negotiations on new
verification protocols. These two treaties were ratified in 1990.
With the end of
the Cold War, the need for improved warheads dropped and pressures for a CTBT
grew. The U.S.S.R. and France began nuclear test moratoria in October 1990
and April 1992, respectively. In early 1992, many in Congress favored a
one-year test moratorium. The effort led to the Hatfield-Exxon-Mitchell amendment to the
FY 1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, which banned testing
before July 1,1993, set conditions on a resumption of testing, banned testing
after September 1996 unless another nation tested, and required the President to
report to Congress annually on a plan to achieve a CTBT by September 30, 1996.
President George H.W. Bush signed the bill into law (P.L. 102-377) October 2,1992.
The CTBT was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. It was adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly on September 10,1996, and was opened for signature
on September 24, 1996.3 As of April 30, 2008,178 states had signed it and 144 had ratified.4
National
Positions on Testing and the CTBT
United States: Under the Hatfield-Exxon-Mitchell
amendment, President Clinton had to decide whether to ask Congress to resume testing.
On July 3,1993, he said, "A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to
halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons," and "the nuclear weapons
in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable." While testing offered
advantages for safety, reliability, and test ban readiness, "the price we
would pay in conducting those tests now by undercutting our own
nonproliferation goals and ensuring that other nations would resume testing outweighs these
benefits." Therefore, he (1) extended the moratorium at least through
September 1994; (2) called on other nations to extend their moratoria; (3) said
he would direct DOE to "prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do
so from Congress" if another nation tested; (4) promised to "explore other means of
maintaining our confidence in the safety, the reliability and the performance of
our own weapons"; and (5) pledged to refocus the nuclear weapons
labatorories toward technology for nuclear nonproliferation and arms control
verifaction.How extend the moratorium twice; on January 30,1995,the
Administration announced his decision to extend the moratorium until a CTBT
entered into force, assuring it was signed by September 30,1996
Critics
expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new
weapons. A statement by Physicians for Social Responsibility said, "The
Administration's plan ... would streamline our nuclear arsenal into a
war-fighting force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear
weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons
testing."7 Another critic felt that increased funding for test
readiness would in effect give prior approval for testing.
In July 2002 a National Academy of
Sciences panel report on technical aspects of the CTBT concluded, in the words
of an press release, "that verification capabilities for the treaty are
better than generally supposed, U.S. adversaries could not significantly
advance their nuclear weapons capabilities through tests below the threshold of
detection, and the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain
confidence in the safety and reliability of its existing weapons stockpile
without periodic nuclear tests."8
A
U.N. draft document of August 5,2005, for signature by heads of government and
heads of state at the U.N. General Assembly meeting of September 2005,
contained a provision that the signers "resolve to ... [m]maintains a
moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and call upon all States to sign and
ratify the Treaty."9 John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., reportedly called for major changes to the draft; the CTBT passage was
one of many drawing his objection.10
In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate.
In October 1999, the Senate rejected it, 48 for, 51 against, 1 present. It is
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's calendar. It would require a two-thirds
Senate vote to send the treaty back to the President for disposal or to give
advice and consent for ratification.
The Bush
Administration opposes the CTBT, adheres to the test moratorium, has not ruled
out resumed testing, and has no plans to test. It has reduced the time needed
to conduct a nuclear test. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new
weapons.
On June 25, 2007, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated:
the Administration does not support
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and does not intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its
ratification. There has been no change in the Administration's policy on this
matter. By reducing the likelihood of the need to return to underground nuclear
testing, RRW [the Reliable Replacement Warhead] makes it more likely that
the United States would be able to continue its voluntary nuclear testing
moratorium. We cannot, however, provide guarantees regarding the voluntary
moratorium. We may find at some future time that we cannot diagnose or remedy a
problem in a warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a
nuclear test.11
Where has
been conduct Nuclear Test and who continue it?
While
supporting the continued voluntary moratorium on testing, the Administration strongly opposes a provision of
section 3122 that calls for the ratification of the CTBT. It would be imprudent
to tie the hands of a future administration that may have to conduct a test of
an element of an aging, unmodified
stockpile in order to assure the reliability of the nuclear deterrent force. Absent such a test, the United States may
not be able to diagnose or remedy a
problem in a warhead critical to the Nation's deterrent strategy.12
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom cannot test
because it held its nuclear tests for several decades at the Nevada Test Site
and does not have its own test site. Its last test was held in 1991. Britain
and France became the first of the original five nuclear weapon states to
ratify the CTBT, depositing instruments of ratification with the United Nations
on April 6,1998. On February 14,2002, and February 23,2006, the United Kingdom
conducted subcritical experiments jointly with the United States at the Nevada
Test Site.
France: On June 13, 1995, President Jacques
Chirac announced that France would conduct eight nuclear tests at its test site
at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, finishing by the end of May 1996. The
armed services had reportedly wanted the tests to check existing warheads,
validate a new warhead, and develop a computer system to simulate warheads to
render further testing unneeded. Many nations criticized the decision. On
August 10, 1995, France indicated it would halt all nuclear tests once the test
series was finished and favored a CTBT that would ban "any nuclear weapon
test or any other nuclear explosion."13 France conducted six
tests from September 5, 1995, to January 27, 1996. On January 29, 1996, Chirac
announced the end to French testing. On April 6,199 8, France and Britain
deposited instruments of ratification of the CTBT with the United Nations.
Russia: Several press reports between 1996
and 1999 claimed that Russia may have conducted low-yield nuclear tests at its
Arctic test site at Novaya Zemlya; other reports stated that U.S. reviews of
the data determined that these events were earthquakes. Several reports between
1998 and 2000 stated that Russia had conducted "subcritical" nuclear
experiments, discussed below, which the CTBT does not bar. Russia ratified the
treaty on June 30, 2000. In September 2005, Russia reportedly stated that it
intends to continue to observe the moratorium on testing until the CTBT enters
into force as long as other nuclear powers do likewise, and expressed its hope
that the nations that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force will do
so as soon as possible.14 In November 2007, according to Itar-Tass,
Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
"confirmed Russia's unchanging support for the treaty as one
of the key elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an effective nuclear arms limitation
tool."15
China: China did not
participate in the moratorium. It conducted a nuclear test on October
5,1993, that many nations condemned. It countered that it had conducted 39 tests, as
opposed to the 1,054 that the United States had conducted, and needed a few more for safety and
reliability. According to one report, "China will immediately stop nuclear testing once the treaty on the complete ban of
nuclear tests takes effect, [Chinese
Premier] Li Peng said."16 It conducted other tests on June 10 and October 7, 1994, May 15 and August 17,1995,
and June 8 and July 29, 1996. It
announced that the July 1996 test would be its last, as it would begin a
moratorium on July 30, 1996. On
February 29, 2000, the Chinese government submitted the CTBT to the National People's Congress for
ratification. In a white paper of December
2004, China stated its support of early entry into force and, until that happens, its commitment to the test moratorium.
As of April 30, 2008, China had not ratified the treaty.
India: On May 11, 1998,
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that India had
conducted three nuclear tests. The government stated, "The tests conducted
today
were with a fission device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device.... These tests
have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear
programme."17 It announced two more tests May 13. An academic
study concluded, based on seismic data, that India and Pakistan overstated the
number and yields of their tests. India has conducted no tests since May 1998, but
questioned whether the United States should expect India to sign a treaty that the
United States views as flawed. In an Indian-Pakistani statement of June 20, 2004,
"Each side reaffirmed its unilateral moratorium on conducting
further nuclear test explosions" barring "extraordinary events."18
On December 22, 2005, Shri Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State in the Ministry
of External Affairs, said, "India has already stated that it will
not stand in the way of the Entry into Force of the Treaty."19
On August 16, 2007,
India's External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, reportedly told
Why is
it a problem?Meeting Monitoring Challenges
UUnder the
terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a nation suspecting another of
conducting a nuclear test may request that the treaty's 51-member Executive
Council conduct an on-site inspection to determine the nature of the suspect
event. The requesting nation may introduce evidence acquired on its own to
strengthen its case to the organization. On-site inspections must be approved
within 96 hours of receiving an inspection request because of the need to
observe short-lived nuclear phenomena that are produced by a nuclear test. · Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Meeting
Monitoring Challenges . For example, more than 200,000
earthquakes similar in seismic magnitude to a small nuclear explosion occur in
the world every year. Many of these background events can be disregarded
because of their depth or similarity to other events known to be no nuclear.
However, many will not be identified so readily. As a result, the National Data
Center will require a set of tools, largely data-processing software, modeling
capability, and reference databases, to perform what Walter terms
"forensic seismology" to separate a weak potential nuclear test from
background noise. The
Livermore team has been assigned by DOE to focus largely on the Middle East and
North Africa (called MENA) and the western part of the former Soviet Union,
which includes the former Soviet test site at Novaya Zemlya, near the Arctic
Sea (Figure 3). The work has entailed collecting and organizing large
quantities of geological, geophysical, seismological, and human-activities data
within these areas. The task is complicated by the geological diversity of MENA
and by the lack of "ground truth," that is, seismic data from
well-documented earthquakes, mine explosions, or explosions carried out for
seismic calibration purpose
Last April, engineer and seismologist
Dave Harris traveled to Jordan to set up two temporary seismic stations in
cooperation with the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority to record the
seismic signatures of earthquake activity and nearby phosphate mining
operations (Figure 4). "These extra stations provide additional constraint
on the locations of earthquakes in the region and provide us with higher
quality ground truth," explains Harris.
Zucca
note, that potential treaty violators might be tempted to detonate a nuclear
device in the center of a large underground cavity, a technique called
decoupling. The seismic signal from such a test is reduced by a factor of up to
70 through a muffling effect that reduces the amplitude of the signal. A
1-kiloton nuclear explosion, for example, would produce a magnitude in the
range of approximately 2.5 to Contact.Email:mailto:
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Over the past decade, Lawrence Livermore
experts have led the U.S. development of on-site inspection technologies and
procedures; many of these procedures were eventually incorporated into the text
of the treaty. Livermore seismologist Jay Zucca serves as the U.S. point of
contact for the On-Site Inspection Experts Group that meets regularly in
Vienna.